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The  Fifth Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  for  1967  follows 
the  same  concise pattern as  the  Fourth  Report  and  the  preceding  Summary  Report  accom-
panying the Third Report. 
The  Report  proper  includes: 
1.  a  summary  of  the activities of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  its 
Working Parties; 
2.  accident  statistics for  the  period  from  1958  to  1967  with  comments  on  their  trend; 
3.  an  examination of  the  manner  inlwhich  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission's 
recommendations  were  implemented  up  to  1.1.1968,  and  a  summary  of  the regulations 
issued during  1967. 
The  detailed tables of accident statistics,  the  detailed report  on  the 
implementation of  recommendations,  the list of  reports drafted  by  the  Working  Party 
on  Inflammable  Dusts,  the  Working Parties'  terms  of  reference,  the  Sixth  Report  on 
Rescue  Arrangements  for  the period  from  1965  to  1966,  and  the  up-to-date  list of 
members  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  its Working Parties will be 
found  in  a  separate  annex. 
The  present report  also  includes  documentation  on  the  stabilisation of 
ventilation in the  event  of underground  fires. 
5 SECTION  I 
ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  met  twice  in  1967  and  the Restrict-
ed  Committee  three  times,  There  were  20  meetings  of  the  Working Parties on  technical 
aspects  and  of their various expert  committees,  one  of  the  Working Party  on  health, 
five  of  the  Working Parties on  human  factors,  and  two  of  the  panel  of  judges  on  the 
competition for  improved  mine  safety appliances, 
The  end of  1967  was  marked  by  the  transfer of  the  powers  of  Mr.  COPPE, 
Chairman of  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission,  former  Vice-President of  the 
High Authority,  to Mr.  LEVI  SANDRI, Vice-President  of  the  Commission of  the  European 
Communities,  This  transfer of powers  took  place  in connection with  the  merger  of  the 
Executives of  the  European  Communities,  during the meeting of  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  on  15  December,  1967, 
A  further  feature  of  1967  was  the  revision of  the  terms  of  reference  and 
set-up of  the  Working Parties,  The  terms  of  reference were  simplified,  their aims 
delimited and  where  necessary  their time-limits set.  They  were  also divided  into 
two  parts,  the first relating to  topics  capable of  leading fairly quickly  to practi-
cal conclusions,  the  second  to work  requiring preliminary spadework  before  being 
submitted to  the  Working Parties,  This preliminary work will be  carried out  by  the 
Secretariat  for  the  purpose  of rationalisation and  with  a  view to  easing the  burden of 
work  falling on  experts confronted with  increasingly difficult tasks  in their  coun-
tries.  The  Secretariat will also  occupy  itself with  questions calling for  periodic 
review  in order  to  keep  up  with  technological  advances, 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  also  recommended  that the  num-
ber of  expert  committees  be  limited and  that  they  should  not  be  set up  without  having 
obtained its permission beforehand. 
As  a  result of this reorganisation,  the  Working Parties on  Rescue Arrange-
ments  and  on  Mine  Fires and  Underground  Combustion were  merged  into  a  single  Working 
Party,  their permanent  terms  of  reference  being  the  study of accidents within their 
scope  and  the  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  them, 
The  Working Party on  Health,which  continues  the activities of  the  former 
Working  Party on Medical  Problems of  a  Safety Policy,  began its activities in  1967, 
In connection with  the activities of  the  Working  Party on  Psychological 
Factors affecting Safety,  a  restricted meeting was  held of  the officials responsible 
for  conducting safety  campaigns,  its aim being to  take  stock of  knowledge  gained in 
this field with  a  view  to  the organisation of  such  campaigns  on  a  Community  scale, 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  CommiSsion  having  intimated that the results 
of its work  should be  more  rapidly disseminated  among  interested parties  by  means 
of  interim reports,  the  first  such  reports  on  the activities of  the  Working Parties 
on  Combustible  Dusts  and Electrification were  submitted to  the  meetings  of  the 
Restricted Committee  and  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission held  in December 
1967,  The  Working  Party on  Rescue Arrangements  and  Fires and  Underground  Combustion 
also submitted  a  report drafted by  the  Expert  Committee  on Ventilation. 
The  Working  Party on Effects of Working  Time  on  Safety of  Work,  especially 
in Difficult or  Unhealthy  Conditions,  met  to  study the last item of its terms  of 
reference,  relating to  damp  workings, 
Finally,  the  Panel  of  Judges  on  the  Competition for  Improved  Mine  Safety 
Appliances  completed its work. 
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The  Commission's  Secretariat also assisted in teach-ins  for  trade-union 
officials at Douai  and Haltern  am  See. 
As  in the  previous  Report  and  the  Summary  Report  of  the  Third Report, 
Section  I  consists of  a  very brief account  of  the original purpose  of  the  activities 
of each  Working  Party,  the  progress  made  in  1967,  the  conclusions  reached,  and  pro-
blems still outstanding. 
I.  TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 
A.  Resc.ue  Arrangements,  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion 
The  two  Working Parties on  Rescue  Arrangements  and  on  Mine  Fire  and  Under-
ground  Combustion,  which  had  already met  on  common  ground  and  shared several  members, 
were  merged  by  a  decision of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  with  a  view  to 
rationalisation and  economy. 
Mr.  Heller,who  was  appointed  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  at 
the  end of  1966  to succeed Mr.  Latten, ls the  Chairman of the  two  merged  Working  Par-
ties which  first met  in their  new  form  on  10  November  1967.  The  merged  Working Party's 
terms  of reference as  reviewed  and  adopted  by  the  Commission  on  24-25  April  1967, 
will be  found  in the Annex  to this Report. 
Matters specifically relating to  rescue  work will be  solely dealt with  by 
the  rescue station leaders  who  are  members  of  the  new  merged  Working  Party. 
The  Working  Party held three plenary meetings  and  three meetings  on  rescue 
work. 
l.  Shaft  fires 
Previous activities were  referred to  on  page  9  of  the  Fourth  Report.  After 
the  fire  experiment  carried out with  the  High Authority's  financial  support  in an 
abandoned pit at Dorstfeld,  studies were  continued on  fire extinction by  spraying, 
by  assembling  documentary  information on studies  and  research,  especially with  small-
scale models,  and  the results of cold-water  spraying carries out  in Belgium. 
After  examining this material,  the  Committee  investigated the possibility 
of performing tests with  small-scale models  for  the better understanding of  the  way 
in which  a  shaft fire starts,  particularly a  fire which  spreads along  a  shaft wall, 
and  means  of controlling it. 
The  Committee  met  twice.  It recognised  the  scientific value  of these  tests 
with  small-scale models,  but  thought  they  should  be  confirmed  by  means  of actual 
scale tests which  are  costly and required much  preparation.  The  Committee  was  there-
fore  uncertain whether,  at present,  the  tests deserved priority over  other research 
work  called for  by  the  present situation in  the  coalmining  industry.  It noted that 
the risk of shaft fires being caused  by  air entering  from  older  abandoned workings 
had  in fact  been  reduced,  and  in this connection it stressed the  importance  of pre-
venting  the  kind of shaft fire referred  to  in  the  Conference  and  in  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  Resolutions with  special reference  to  the  fi.reproof  lining of 
new  pits.  Lastly,  it specified which  of its directives of  8  April  1960  on  the  control 
of shaft fires  should  be  reviewed  in  the  light of  information  gained  from  certain 
cold-spraying trials,  especially the  aeromotive  power  of  the  water  discharge  which 
should  allow  for  the  space  occupied  by  the  coalface  supports. 
The  conclusions were  approved  by  the  Working  Party  and  the  Restricted 
Committ,ee,  but  consideration of  the  question  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commis-
sion had  to  be  postponed until  1968.  After  the  Expert  Committee  has  revised  the  di-
rectives of  8  April  1960,  its work  will have  been  completed. 2.  Fire-resistant fluids 
Under  the Working Party's  terms  of reference,  the experts  on  this Committee 
met  four  times  for  the  purpose  of: 
- comparing results so  as  to  avoid  the  same  products  being differently valuated  by 
different testing stations.  In  this connection,  a  restricted meeting was  held at  the 
Institut National  des  Mi~~s at Paturages,  to  compare  once  again certain elements 
in the  flammability  test; 
- where  necessary,  bringing the test criteria into  line with  technological progress. 
- Within  this context,  the  Expert  Committee  has  drafted certain technological  and 
health criteria with  a  view  to  the publication of  a  "Third Report  on  the specifi-
cation and  test conditions relating to fire-resistant  power  transmission  fluids" 
(1), 
The  Working Party experienced some  difficulty in applying  these criteria 
and  thought  the  requirements  might  be  too strict and  preclude  the  use  of oils which, 
although  not  conforming to  the  specifications,  were still less  flammable  than  the 
mineral oils still in use,  It therefore  asked  the  Expert  Committee  to  examine  the 
advisability of  linking the  specifications relating to various  fluids with  their 
specific use,  the  amounts  employed,  and  the  fire risk  inherent  in machinery using 
these oils,  with  a  view  to relaxing the  flammability  criteria,  The  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  included this request  in the  terms  of  reference, 
The  Expert  Committee  studied this  item  and  gave  a  negative  reply,  its view 
being that  no  products exist which,  although  not  fulfilling the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission's  requirements,  were  fire-resistant,  had  the  same  lubricating 
qualities as  mineral oils,  and  did  not  involve  any  technical modifications  to  the 
installations, 
It is therefore satisfactory to  note  that  the  Expert  Committee's  work  and 
the  know-how  acquired  through  mine  trials in this still comparatively  unknown  field, 
have  attracted the  attention of other  industries such  as  forging  and  casting plants, 
The  Expert  Committee  then considered the  question of certain fluids,  known 
to  be  fire-resistant,  but  causing premature  wear  and  tear of bearings  whose  life may 
thereby  be  reduced  to  20%  of  the  value  reached with  mineral oil. 
In  view  of  these  difficulties,  research  work will be  carried out  in  Germany 
in an  attempt  to  adapt  the present materials  to  the use  of fire-resistant oils, 
Lastly,  the  Commission  decided  (1)  that the  Secretariat,  together with  the 
Working  Party on  Rescue Arrangements,  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion,  should  keep 
track of  the  problem and, in due  course, review  the  criteria and  test methods  with 
the possible help  of  the Expert  Committee, 
3,  Foamed  urethane seals 
The  Working  Party was  then  led to  consider  the  risks  involved when  stopping 
roadways  with  foamed  urethane,  i,e,  spontaneous  combustion,  very rapid  flame  propaga-
tion,  and static electricity. 
It heard  the  results of trials,  which  were  not  subsidised by  the  Community, 
carried out at  the  Hasselt Centre  de  Coordination des  Centrales  de  Sauvetage  and at 
the  Dortmund  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft,  Practical solutions appear  to have  been 
found,  The  Secretariat has  been  instructed to  follow  up  this question and  in due 
course  to place it on  the  agenda, 
(1)  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission Decision dated 26 April  1968. 
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4.  Opening-up of stoppings  of fire zones 
The  Working Party studied cases  in which  fire  zones  had  been  successfully 
opened  up  by  means  of various  techniques,  One  fire  zone  in the  Cevennes  Colliery was 
opened  up  by  the  "pistoning"  method  in which  the  dangerous mixture  was  rapidly driven 
by  an  air blast  into  roadways  from  which  workmen  had  been  evacuated and  spark sources 
removed,  Fire  zones  in the  Dortmurrj  colliery area were  opened  up  by  the  method  of  con-
tinuously driving out  a  gaseous  mixture  in an  attempt  to dilute it to  a  safe content. 
5,  Rescue  by  means  of  large boreholes 
The  Working  Party considered  the  problems still involved  in rescuing  trapped 
miners  by  means  of  large boreholes  not  excavated  from  the  surface  as  was  the case  at 
Lengede  and  Champagnoles,  but  from  underground  roadways,  These  boreholes  have  already 
been  the  subject of  national research  in Lorraine,  Pas-de-Calais and  the  Ruhr,  The 
Working Party concluded that  the  problems still outstanding could  be  settled by  means 
of trials which  should be  on  a  Community  level since very  extensive  and  rarely used 
facilities would  be  needed,  thus  calling for  an  alignement  of research  and materials, 
The  Working Party drew  up  a  list of trials to  be  carried out,  specifying 
their object, 
The  Restricted Committee  approved  these  proposals  on  5  December  1967.  Under 
Section  5  of its terms  of reference,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission will pro-
pose  to  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  that research  be  undertaken  in 
this field  (1). 
6,  Ventilation 
The  ventilation experts did  not  meet  in  1967.  As  stated on  page  11  of  the 
Fourth  Report,  the  conclusions  drawn  from  the  work  they  have  been  engaged  on  since 
1961,  were  submitted  in the  form  of  a  report entitled ''Stabilisation of  the ventila-
tion o:f  a  mine  in  the  event of fire",  a  documentary  report  dated  September  1967  on 
Professor Budryk's  theory,  and  a  document  on  ''Practical Conclusions  on  the  Ventila-
tion Stabilisation Theory", 
The  documentary  report  was  submitted  to  the  Working  Party.  It is a  scien-
tific account  o:f  which the main  and  most  original  feature  is  a  mathematical  demon-
stration of  the validity of Budryk's basic  formula  as  applied  to  the  most  complex 
cases occurring  in modern  mines.  It also  showed  that it was  possible  to calculate 
mathematically  the  maximum  possible  disturbing effect of  the  fire,  so  that  the  areas 
threatened by  inversion when  a  fire breaks out at  a  particular point  can  be  deter-
mined  beforehand.  Lastly,  it made  clear that  although  the  theory  was  based on Polish 
mines,  it is equally applicable  to  the  conditions prevailing in Community  mines  in 
all cases of fires at ascensionally-ventilated working points  in  gassy  and  non-gassy 
mines, 
These  studies are  valuable  inasmuch  as  they  take  a  new  look  at the  impor-
tant question of mine  ventilation,  with particular reference  to  the unstable ventila-
tion that  may  arise  and  is in fact  an  :lncreasingly  common  occurrence with  the pre-
sent concentration of pits, 
Having  regard  to  the  scientific nature  of this report,  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Heacl th Commission  approved  the  Worldng Party's suggestion that it should  be  dis-
tributed to selected organisations,  i,e,  to  Coal  Boards  for  wider  dissemination,  and 
to all specialised international bodies, 
The  practical conclusions arrived at  by  the  Expert  Comm:ittee  were  first 
investigated by  the  Working  Party  in  1968  (2),  After  they  have  been studied by  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  thElY  will be  passed  on  to  the  Governments  for 
further  action, 
(1)  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  Decision dated 26  April  1968. 
(2)  The  investigation was  concluded  on  24  April  1968, As  regards  the  implementation of  research work  in this field,  the  Mines 
Safety  and Health  Commission  is of  the opinion that the  Working Party's  terms of 
reference  should be  extended  to  cover all ventilation problems  owing  to their possi-
ble bearing on  fires. 
7.  Rescue  arrangements 
The  experts  on  Rescue  Arrangements  met  twice.  One  meeting consisted of  a 
visit to  the Central Rescue  Station at Lens  where  designers of breathing and  detec-
tion apparatus exhibited their latest models  and  explained how  they work.  Mention 
should be  made  of respirators  for  a  normal  exposure  of  3  hrs.  or  a  short exposure 
of  45  mins.,  an  explosimeter  for  rapid testing of  the explosibility of  gas  mixtures 
and,  lastly,  a  very  simple  colorimetric detector which  responds  to  a  low  CO  content. 
The  experts also studied,  together  with  local specialists,  problems still 
outstanding in rescue  work  by  means  of  large boreholes. 
B.  Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft  Guides 
The  Working Party met  twice  and  examined  the  following matters under  its 
terms of reference: 
1.  Electro-magnetic testing of winding ropes 
TheMinesSafety  and Health Commission's  report  on  this matter  gave  rise to 
a  number  of positions being taken up.  It was  pointed out that the  method  described 
has certain advantages.  Although  the  report  drew  attention to  the  limitations of  the 
method,  it by  no  means  wished to  give  the  impression that it could not  be  employed. 
It is now  being regularly used  by  the  Bochum  Winding  Rape  Centre,  which  has  also 
adopted it for  types  of winding ropes  not used  in mines. 
2.  Testing  of  couplings  for  circular strand and  flattened-strand winding  ropes 
The  Working  Party  examined  ten cases of  coupling accidents;  their causes 
were  defined and  precautionary measures  advocated.  This study will be  resumed  and 
completed;  the  lessons to be  learned are equally applicable  elsewhere,  e.g.  to cable-
ways  and  railways. 
The  Secretariat was  instructed to  compile  a  comparative  table of regula-
tions  in this sphere. 
3.  Study of mechanical  stresses on  the shaft  guides of winding ropes 
The  Working  Party  took  note  of  an electrical dynamometer  for  measuring  the 
mechanical  stresses to which  shaft guides are subject.  It asked  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  for  authority to  deal with  this question  in connection with  research 
work  proposed  by  the  Tremonia  Experimental  Mine. 
Without  prejudice to  a  possible decision to ask  the  Commission  that further 
work  on this subject  might  be  undertaken,  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission 
authorised  the  Working  Party  to  go  to  the  Tremonia  Experimental  Mine  te ascertain 
what  facilities are available  there. 
C.  Electrification 
During  two  meetings,  the  Working  Party  continued to  exchange  notes  on  the 
deleterious effects of salt pastes and  on  the  design of  flexible  cables  for  movable 
equipment  (1). 
(1)  See  p.  13  of  the  Fourth  Report. 
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It submitted  to  the Restricted Committee  (l)  an  interim report  on  the  dele-
terious effects on  underground electrical installations of  the  moisture  in salt pastes 
and  salt powders  used  in dust  suppression. 
The  study of  the  design of  flexible  cables  for  supplying voltages  of  up 
to  1,100 volts  to  such  mobile  equipment  as coal-cutters and  assoeiated safety devices 
has  almost  been  completed;  the  results are  shown  in  the  form  of  a  table  summarising 
the position at present  and  in  the  near  future  in  the different  Community  countries. 
In  the  meantime,  restricted meetings  have  been  held with  the  Secretariat 
with  a  view  to preparing these  documents. 
In  conclusion,  following  the  investigations held  into  the  accident at  the 
"Unser  Fritz"  Mine  ar Wanne-Eickel,  the  Working  Party was  given  new  terms  of  reference 
by  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission at its meeting of  15  December  1967,  relating 
to  the  design of electric cables  for  voltages  of up  to 6,000 volts  and  devices  used 
to protect  such  cables. 
D.  Combustible  Dusts 
The  Working Party met  once  to  examine  the work  of  its  two  groups  of  rap-
porteurs  (including representatives  from  the  United  Kingdom).  The  instructions  given 
to  this Working  Party are  the direct results of  the  conclusions  drawn  from  the Lui-
senthal disaster.  The  first and  most  urgent part of  the  instructi.ons  was  dealt with 
in reports  adopted  by  the Restricted Committee  on  5  December  1967  (1).  These  relate 
to  dust barriers used  for  preventing the  spread of  dust  explosions  and  include: 
- An  aide-m~moire for  investigating officers on  what  useful accident  data  to collect 
for  the  study of  dust  explosions. 
This  aide-m~moire is not  an  injunction and  in  no  way  affects national 
obligations regarding accident  inquiries.  It is to  be  considered as  an  aid  to  the 
work  of  the  investigating officers,  enabling  them  to assemble  any  useful accident-
cause  data  and  providing a  guide  to  future  studies  and  research. 
- Comments  on  dust  explosions  in  the  Community  and  the  United  Kingdom  since  1950. 
Only  typical accidents  have  been  selected;  names  have  been omitted and  the  comments 
will  be  disseminated. 
In  future,  data  on  both  dust  and  fire  damp  explosions will  be  recorded  and 
disseminated,  since  firedamp  is often  found  together with  dust  in  the  explosion 
procc3ss. 
- Bibliographical studies on  trials and  research  undertaken  in  Germany,  France  and 
Britain on  the  stopping of  dust  and  firedamp-dust  explosions. 
- A  joint programme  of trials to  be  drawn  up  as  soon as possible  to fill the  gaps 
discovered;  its aim will  be  as  follows: 
a)  To  make  a  thorough  study of  the  phenomenon; 
b)  to  extend  the  efficiency of  dust barriers to very  large  <:ross-sections,  very 
slight explosions  and  very  violent  explosions; 
c)  to bring dust  barriers  more  into  line with  the  kind of  equipment  at  present 
used  in collieries. 
It is hoped  that this progranune  can  be  financed  by  the  Commission of  the 
European  Communities. 
- A  system of joint reports  on trials undertaken  in the  Community  and  Great Britain 
which  would  provide  a  basis  for  a  uniform classification of  the results of  trials 
relating to dust  and  firedamp  explosions. 
The  Restricted Committee  (2)  approved  the  Working Party's work  on  5  Decem-
ber  1967,  and  decided  to  make  it known  in  the  appropriate quarters. 
(l)  Approved  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  26  April  1968. 
(2)  And  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  on  26  April  1968. Work  under  the  terms  of reference will  be  continued,  particularly the study 
of  dust  neutralisation,  and  account will  be  taken of  the  fact  that,  in most  cases, 
firedamp  is  found  together with  combustible dusts  when  an  explosion  is triggered off 
and  spread. 
E.  High Authority Competition  for  Improved  Mine  Safety Devices 
This  competition closed on  29  June  1967,  so  that  the  work  may  now  be  con-
veniently  summarised.  This  work  was  continuously  followed  by  the  Mines  Safety and 
Health  Commission  since  the  competition had  been organised  by  the  High Authority  in 
1957  in accordance with  a  recommendation  by  the  Mines  Safety Conference. 
In  1962,  the  initial prizes  amounting  to  130,000 units of account  were 
awarded  for: 
l)  two  pocket methanometers, 
2)  a  portable  firedamp  detector, 
3)  three  carbon monoxide  recorders, 
4)  two  fully-protective  automatic  safety devices. 
The  methanometers  and  firedamp  detector  could  replace  the miner's  conven-
tional  flame  safety  lamp,  at any  rate  for  firedamp  detection.  The  carbon monoxide 
recorders  could give  an early warning of  a  fire  and  follow  its course with  a  view 
to overcoming it and  making  sure it is completely  extinguished.  Lastly the  fully-
protective automatic safety devices  would  enable miners  to  escape  from  a  smoke-laden 
atmosphere  due  to  a  fire or  explosion;  this atmosphere  may  be  contaminate  with  carbon 
monoxide  or  deficient  in oxygen. 
It should  be  noted  that the miner's  conventional  flame  safety  lamp  not  only 
provides  illumination but also  a  ready  indication of  the  presence  of  firedamp  or 
carbon monoxide,  or atmospheres deficient  in oxygen. 
Although  the  competition had called for  a  flameless  apparatus  for  detecting 
and  giving warning,  of  a  given oxygen  deficiency,  no  suitable entry was  submitted as 
it proved  too  diff~cult to dispense with  the  gas-detection  flame.  The  closing date 
was  therefore extended  and  a  prize of  70,000 units of account  offered.  To  encourage 
designers,  the  requirements  of  the first competition were  relaxed as  follows: 
- the  pocket  format  was  no  longer  specified,  although  in shape,  size and weight  the 
apparatus  was  to  embody  the  same  characteristics as  a  portable electric  lamp; 
- the content setting off the  alarm was  raised  from  15%-18% to  17%-19%; 
- flame  safety  lamps  were  no  longer  barred,  provided  they  comprised certain basic 
improvements  over  the conventional  type  of miner's  lamp. 
But  the apparatus was still required  to fulfil strict requirements  as  to 
accuracy  (±  1%),  maximum  response  time  of  10 sees.,  insensitivity to  disturbing 
factors,  and  the  robust  design  needed  to  cope  with  the  severe  underground  conditions. 
Despite this stringency,  19  devices  were  submitted to  the  Panel  on  8  Octo-
ber  1964,  7  being of  the  flame  and  12  of  the  flameless  type. 
The  measuring principles on  which  these  devices operate are  not  new.  The 
flameless  type  is based on  physico-chemical  principles  (the  thermal  effect of  an 
exothermic  reaction with  combustible  vapours),  electro-chemical principles  (battery) 
or purely physical principles  (oxygen  paramagnetism).  The  safety principles of  the 
flame-type  devices are  the  length or brightness of  the  flame,  Firedamp  hazard  is 
assessed and  indicated by  electromagnetic or  electronic relays. 
Considerable difficulties  ha~ to  be  overcome  to apply  principles  to  such  a 
small-sized device.  This  fact,  together with  the  large  number  of devices  submitted 
for  the Panel's consideration,  gives  a  good  idea of  the  value  of  the  1957  competi-
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The  devices were  checked  in laboratories of  the  following  Community  re-
search stations: 
- the PrUfstelle  fUr  Grubenbewetterung,  Bochum, 
- the  Forschungsstelle  fUr  Grubenbewetterung,  Essen-Kray, 
- the  CERCHAR,  Verneuil,  France, 
- the  Institut National  des  Mines,  P:tturages,  Belgium, 
- the  Staatsmijnen Proefstation,  Treebeek,  Netherlands. 
These  laboratory tests,  which  were  prepared and  supervised by  groups  of 
rapporteurs appointed by  the  Panel,  were  carried out  in stages corresponding to  the 
difficulty of  the  checking required and  the  amount  of  equipment  needed,  some  15,000 
measurements  being called for. 
During  these trials numerous  entries were  rejeeted by  the Panel,  so  that 
by  September  1965,  the  closing date,  only  two  variants of  a  flame-type  apparatus  and 
four  flameless  ones  (including  two  embodiments  of  the  same  prototype)  remained  in 
the  running. 
These  remaining entries were  then subjected to  six-month  carrying tests 
underground at selected mines  in order  to test,  in parti<:ular,  their performance 
and  robustness.  But  prolonged  investigations  and  Inspectorate approval  were  needed 
before  they could  be  used underground.  Unfortunately,  the certification conditions 
regarding  flameproof  properties and  intrinsic safety has  not  yet  been  standardised 
throughout  the  Community,  and  this has held up  and  complicated  Inspectorate approval. 
Underground  testing of  the  devices  in the  Ruhr  and Lorraine coalfields was  not  begun 
until  the end  of  1966,  One  nore  flameless  device  was  eliminated  from  the  competition 
during  these tests, 
The  Panel  met  on  29  June  1967,  and  decided  to make  the  following  awards 
to  the designers of  the  three  remaining devices: 
1st prize of  40,000 units of  account  to 
Bergbau-F'orschung  GmbH 
Physikalische Abteilung 
Essen-Kray 
2nd prize of  15,000 units of  account  to 
Auergesellschaft  GmbH,  Berlin 
An  award  of  10,000 units of account  to 
Institut National  des  Mines,  P:tturages 
The  Bergbau-Forschung device  is already suitable for  use  in mines,  although 
its 2,960  g  weight  should be  reduced,  Its safety principle is based  on  oxygen  para-
magnetism, 
The  Auer  device  weighs  1,460 g,  but  needs  certain  modifications before 
it can  be  used  in  a  mine.  Its safety principle is based  on  the  amount  of heat,  in 
proportion to  the  atmospheric  oxygen  content,  which  is released by  the  combustion 
of cyclohexane  vapour  and measured  by  a  Wheatstone  bridge,  This principle might 
enable both  oxygen  deficiency and  firedamp  to  be  detected by  the  same  apparatus. 
Lastly,  the  lamp  designed  by  the  Institut National  des  Mines  is a  benzine 
lamp without  illuminating power.  The  brilliance of  the  flame,  depending  on  the  02 
percentage,  actuates  a  photoelectric cell which  controls at  a  distance  the  ignition 
or extinction of  the wearer's cap  lamp  via  a  short-wave  transmitter,  It is the  same 
weight  as the ordinary benzine  lamp  (1,850  g)  and  is very safe for  use  in  a  fire-
damp  atmosphere,  It can also  be  used as  a  methanometer.  It needs  some  modifications 
before it can  be  used  in mines, F.  Study of Accidents 
Only  one  accident  (at  the Panissiere  mine  on  2  March  1967)  was  notified to 
the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  in  1967  and  was  dealt with  in an  interim re-
port.  This  Commission  also  examined  the  final reports  on  four  other accidents which 
occurred  in previous years,  viz.: 
a)  Accident at the Panissiere Colliery,  Houilleres  du  Bassin des  Cevennes  2.3.1967. 
Sudden outburst of  C02 ,  5  killed. 
Pending  the  final conclusions  reached at the  enquiry,  the  main  circum-
stances can  be  summarised  as  follows: 
The  sudden outburst occurred  in  a  coalface  in  a  thin seam during  a  coal-
getting shift preceded  by  shatter blasting.  This blasting replaced  the  expansion 
holes which  had  caused drilling difficulties owing  to  extensive  coal production. 
At  the  scene of  the accident,  the  men  were still in the  expansion hole area, 
This was  an outburst of  gas  mainly  consisting of  C02 • 
b)  Accident  at  the  Mont-Cenis Colliery,  Herne-Solingen,  22.7.1965,  9  killed,  firedamp 
explosion. 
The  firedamp  explosion occurred while  a  shaft fire was  being  isolated by 
stopping.  The  accident  was  investigated  by  the  Working  Party on  Mine  Fires and 
Underground  Combustion,  the  findings  being as  follows: 
l. Pit Fires. 
1.1.  Any  attempt  to  deal with  a  pit fire  is a  race  against  time,  The  fatal  outcome 
at  the  Mont-Cenis  Colliery was  due  tot the rapid and unexpected  extension of 
the  fire which  spread more  quickly  than stopping operations  could be  carried 
out. 
1.2.  The  essential conditions  for  effective fire-fighting are early detection of 
a  pit fire  and  rapid provision of air-tight stoppings.  Consequently,  the 
Working Party on  Rescue  Arrangements,  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion  should 
pay  particular attention to  technological  advances  in these  fields. 
1.3.  The  proper appraisal of  a  fire at  the  initial stage,  its effect on  mining 
operations,  and  the selection and use  of  appropriate  fire-fighting facilities 
call for  such  great  experience  that,  even  for  the  smallest  and apparently 
harmless  fire,  the officials in charge  should enlist the aid of  the  specia-
list services  (rescue stations)  which  exist  in all Community  countries  (as 
the  Mont-Cenis officials did  in  good  time). 
1.4.  The  rules and  regulations  governing  the  prevention and  control of pit fires, 
as  laid  down  by  the  mining authorities of  the  Community  and  the United  King-
dom,  should  be set out synoptically,  discussed by  the  Working  Party,  and 
presented  in the  form  of  a  recommendation  after it has utilised experience 
gained  in this field. 
2.  Rescue Arrangements. 
2.1.  Thanks  and praises are  due  to  the  mine  rescue  teams  who,  under  the  most  dif-
ficult conditions,  spared  no  pains  to rescue miners  trapped  in  the explosion 
area. 
2.2.  In  the  case of Mont-Cenis,  rescue  teams  from  neighbouring collieries had  to 
be  called in under  the mutual  aid plan organised by  the  mining authorities. 
This  again revealed  the  need  for  an aid plan which  would  cover  any  eventual-
ity.  Priority should  be  given  to  the  Working Party's efforts to draft  a 
supranational aid plan,  with particular reference  to  the special rescue 
equipment  owned  by  the  various  rescue services,  as well  as  to  the  experts 
engaged  therein. 
2.3.  The  rules and  regulations  governing rescue work,  as set out  by  the mining 
authorities of  the  Community  and  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the medical aid 
system,  should be  aligned by  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission's  Secre-
tariat,  after which  the  findings  should be utilised by  the  Working  Party. 
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2.4.  At  the  time  of  the accident,  the  fireproof  garments  worn  by  members  of  the 
Rescue  Team were  found  unsatisfactory under  the prevailing conditions.  The 
Working Party should  study  the  requirements  expected of  fireproof  clothing 
in the  various  Community  countries as well  as  the  general  specifications. 
2.5.  Past  experience,including that  gained  in the Mont-Cenis  accident,  shows  how 
essential it is for  the  rescue  service management  to  have  its own  office  in 
the administrative buildings,  where  it can work  undisturbed.  During  the 
actual  rescue operations,  all persons outside,  whatever  their rank,  should 
only  be  informed of  the progress  made  via special liaison officers attached 
to the  rescue  service  management,  and  not  by  the  head  of  the  rescue  station 
himself. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Co~nission approved  these  findings  and  directed 
the  Working Party on  Rescue Arrangements,  Mine  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion 
to  study paragraphs  1.2.,  1.4., 2.2.,  2.3.  and 2.4.,  as well  as  the  problem of 
indicating and  closing dangerous  areas,  for  instance  those  where  a  firedamp  ex-
plosion hazard exists. 
c)  Acc:ident  at the Rossenray Pit,  16.2.1966,  16  killed,  firedamp  explosion. 
The  accident occurred  in  a  new  pit where  the  seam-working method  is employ-
ed,  i.  e.  in which  little preliminary work  is needed  on  the stonedrifts,  the  road-
ways  being  tunnelled beforehand along the strike of  the  seam and  in the  seam it-
self. 
The  firedamp  was  ignited by  a  short-circuit spark  from  a  junctionbox  open-
ed under  voltage  and  on which  an  electrician had  been  working.  This  firedamp  came 
from  old workings,  situated near  the  damaged  roadway  from  which  they were  sealed 
off  by  glass-wool  stoppings.  The  roadway  was  strongly ventilated,  but ventilation 
conditions  in the district were  found  to  be  unstable. 
As  a  result of  the  accident,  the  following precautions were  taken: 
1)  for  better supervision of  the  ventilation conditions,  a  full-time ventilation 
engineer  has  been  assigned to  the  Rossenray  pit; 
2)  a  list will  be  compiled of all walls  and  stoppings which  will be  periodically 
inspected to  check their gas-tightness and  measure  their pr,essure  conditions. 
The  lists can  always  be  consulted by  the  Mines  Department; 
3)  the  supports of  roadways  tunnelled  by  the  continuous miner  are  to  be  reinforced 
by  two  clamp  bolts for  each pit prop  secured  to  the walls  and  by  one  clamp  bolt 
for  each  bar.  To  prevent  the  supports  from  collapsing,  a  bar  is also to  be  fix-
ed  to  the  roof at 25m intervals; 
4)  the  brickwork walls prescribed by  the  Mines  Departm43nt  regulations to  ensure 
the closure of underground  workings  where  the ventilation is temporarily inter-
rupted may  only  be  replaced  by  S:Lllan  cushion stopp:ings  provided these  are 
lined with  gas-tight  latex. 
The  accident also  focused  attention on  the  new  problems arising out  of  the 
coal-winning method  which  are still being studied,  i.e.  latexlined Sillan 
cushions,  suppression of  the  dust  in strike roads entirely in the  seam,  the 
delimiting of areas  tunnelled  by  this method,  the  possible  need  to revert  to 
the  method  of  coalwinning at several  levels  linked  by  staple shafts,  and  ad-
vance  information on  unstable ventilation conditions. 
d)  Accident at  the  Unser  Fritz pit,  30.6.1966,  7  killed,  dust  explosion. 
This  dust  explosion of weak  i.ntensi  ty occurred  in an  intake  near  a  loading 
point,  during shotfiring for  enlarging the  roadway  cross-section. 
It is probable  that  no  firedamp  was  involved.  The  dust  was  ignited by  a 
short-circuit of  a  high-tension(5,000 volt) cable  which  was  freely  suspended  and 
protected by  half-tubes  joined together  and  probably  damaged  by  a  previous shot. 
The  effect of  the  explosion was  limited by  the efficient working of  inert 
dust  stoppings. The  following  findings  were  reached after a  national enquiry: 
1,  After  the explosion,  no  fire  broke  out  except  in  the  cable  duct  of blind shaft 
872,  Despite  the  high  temperatures,  the  plastic ventilation lines only melted; 
other equipment  made  of synthetic material was  deformed  but did  not  burn.  In 
this case,  the  Mines  Regulations  calling for  fireproof materials  gave  good 
results and  were  confirmed, 
2.  During this accident,  the  only  fire point was  the  cable  duct  of blind shaft 
872  which  was  supported  by  wooden  blocks.  Although  the  Mines  Regulations 
specify that cable  ducts are  to be  supported by  incombustible materials,  the 
mine  was  authorised to waive  this rule  owing  to  the  very high  rock  pressure. 
The  accident proved  the  value of  the  Mines  Regulations,  Even with  the  high 
rock  pressure,  wooden  supports  should  not  be  used  in cable  ducts  and  rooms. 
3.  Miners  caught  by  the accident,  who  put  on  their filter-type self-rescuers 
immediately after the explosion,  were  not  found  to  have  any  asphyxia  symptoms. 
The  12  asphyxia  cases  found  were  due  to  the  explosion blast that  prevented  the 
victims  from  using their filter-type self-rescuers, or  from  fitting  them  soon 
enough,  In this connection,  the accident  confirms  that,  when  a  workman  bas his 
rescue  equipment  with  him,  this greatly  increases his  chance  of survival  in 
the  event of  a  pit accident  (explosion or  fire). 
4.  The  use  of  filter-type self-rescue undoubtedly  prevented asphyxiation,  but  some 
workmen  who  wore  the  apparatus  succumbed  to  burns  in the  buccal  cavity through 
inhaling air resulting  from  the  chemical  decomposition of  CO  inside  the self-
rescuer,  and  also  from  chin and  chest burns  caused  by  contact with  the  extremely 
hot outer envelope  of  the apparatus.  To  prevent  such  burns  in the  future,  new 
models  have  been  produced  in which  the  inhaled air is cooled  (for  example,  by 
coolings  fins),  It is essential to  introduce  these  improved  models  as  soon as 
possible. 
5,  This  accident  should again  focus  attention on  the  most  satisfactory method of 
installing underground electrical cable  systems  with  emphasis  on  the  protection 
of high-tension cables. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  instructed the  Working  Party on 
Electrification to  study  the  construction of  underground electric cables of 
up  to  5,000 volts and  the materials  for  their protection. 
e)  Accident at Silverwood,  Yorks.,  3.2,1966,  10 killed,  collission between  trains. 
A  train carrying materials was  following  a  man-riding train on  a  track 
dipping on  average  12  mm/metre  and  in places  40  mm/metre.  The  driver  lost control 
and  jumped  clear,  his train running into  the  one  ahead. 
After  examining  the  final report,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
asked  the Secretariat to  draw  up  a  synoptic table  showing different countries' 
regulations  governing track gradients,  maximum  loads  for  mine-car  trains,  and 
the training of drivers. 
II  - HUMAN  FACTORS 
A.  Health 
The  Working Party responsible  for  continuing certain activities of  the 
Working  Party on  Medical  Problems  of  a  Safety Policy will deal with  the  medical  and 
technical aspects of health. 
In order  to  draw  up  a  programme  of work,  documents  were  assembled  by  the 
Secretariat  in  1966  with  the  help of persons delegated by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  and  the  High Authority Department.  The  definite  programme  was  set out  in 
a  mandate  adopted  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  24  and  25 April  1967. 
In the first stage,  this mandate  only relates to  technical  questions. 
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This  Working Party was  set up  with  tripartite representation,  like the 
Mines  Safety and Health  Commission.  At  present,  it consists of experts  and  dust-sup-
pression  technologists;  its constitution will be  reviewed  to  include  the  study of 
medical  problems. 
The  Working Party  met  once.  It took  note  of its terms  of  reference,  the 
chief of which  is the drafting of  a  possible  recommendation  on  measures  for  control-
ling,  and  general measures  for  reducing,  the  dustiness of underground  workings;  it 
is acknowledged  that such  measures  have  to  some  extent  been effective. 
It heard  a  report  on  the  present state of progress of the  High Authority's 
research work  in this field. 
It was  decided that each  delegation should  supply  the  Secretariat with 
documentary  material  on  dust  control methods  and  try to  grade  these methods  according 
to their e.ffectiveness.  The  measuring methods,  on which  no  agreement  was  reached, 
will  not  be  discussed,  but  the measuring equipment  and selectivity of  the  measurements 
will be  mentioned.  The  Secretariat was  instructed to  assen~ble the  data  needed  for 
working out  a  draft recommendation  based  on  these  documents. 
B.  Working  Party on Effects of  Working  Time  on  Safety at Work,  especially  in difficult 
or unhealthy conditions 
This  group  held  two  meetings,  one  plenary  and  one  restricted. 
In  the  former  terms of refere,nce  stemming  from  the  Safety Congress,  prior-
ity was  given  to the  question of hot  and  wet  working points.  This  complex  subject 
was  dealt with  in a  report  and  recommendation  on  the "fixing of climatic  limits" 
which  was  approved  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  18  june  1963  (cf. 
Third Report,  pages  403-410). 
The  terms  of reference also  i.ncluded  a  study of working  time  spent  in thin 
seams,  It was  decided at a  meeting of  the  Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  that, 
as fewer  and  fewer  of  these  seams  were  being worked,  they  did  not  merit  any  particular 
attention. 
The  one  outstanding item was  hot  working points.  As  atmospheric humidity 
had  been  considered during the  study of  hot  working points,  the  Mines  Safety and 
Health  Commission  decided  to  confine its attention to wet  working points and  drafted 
the  following  provisional  terms  of  reference: 
examination of  the  number  of  hours  worked  in wet  working points, 
determining in what  cases  a  working point  is to  be  considered wet  and  the precau-
tions  to  be  taken, 
At  the meeting of  5  July  1967,  the  Working  Party members  set  forth  the 
following  conclusions which  they  submitted  to  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission: 
- the  problem  om  wet  working points is only sporadically encountered  in Community 
mines; 
- it is not  an  urgent  problem; 
- protective measures  and working hours  are usually laid down  by  the  local authori-
ties; 
- in the  absence  of  any objective criteria for  determining  the wetness  of working 
points,  it is a  difficult matter  to  suggest what  precautionary measures  should  be 
taken on  a  Community  level; 
- it is scarcely feasible  to  limit  the  terms  of reference  to safety questions without 
including health precautions,  these  being  the  chief  factor  to  be  taken  into  con-
sideration; 
- certain other  environmental  factors  such  as  noise,  lighting,  etc.  are  more  urgent. 
After discussing these matters,  the  Working  Party decided  to advise  the 
Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  that  the  question of wet  working points was  not an  urgent  one  to  be  settled on  a  Community  level  and  that if,  nevertheless,  it had 
to be  examined,  this would  mean  a  fairly difficult investigation involving health 
questions,  in which  case  the  Commission  should define  new  terms  of  reference. 
Lack of  time  prevented the Restricted Committee  and  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  from  examining this question at their December  1967  meetings. 
c.  Psychological  and Sociological Factors affecting Safety 
The  terms  of reference of this Working  Party related to: 
safety campaigns, 
- a  draft  recommendation  on  the  employment  of  foreign  and  young workers  (the  items 
still outstanding in the  terms  of reference). 
A  meeting of safety campaign officials employed  in various  Community  coal-
fields was  held at Luxemburg,  for  two  days,  they  had  an  instructive  exchange  of 
views  which  resulted  in  a  great deal of  documentary material being assembled  by  the 
Secretariat. 
The  following  conclusions  may  be  drawn  from  these sessions.  It is both 
useful  and  possible to organise safety campaigns  at  Community  level so  that all can 
profit  from  the  same  experiences  and  audio-visual material,  provided  such  campaigns 
are  actually organised according to mining  zones  where  conditions are  fairly similar, 
The  campaigns  could  be  organised simultaneously  and  cover  the  same  specific topic. 
The  main  subject to be  dealt with  should relate to  the  causes of  rockfalls and  acci-
dents associated with  haulage  and  transport  equipment,  these  together constituting 
the most  frequent  source of accidents  (70%)  in which  the  human  factor  plays  a  con-
siderable part  and  which  could therefore  be  reduced  by  such  campaigns. 
In view of  these safety considerations,  talks on  the dissemination of  in-
formation were  resumed  with  trade union officials and  a  teach-in was  organised at 
Douai  on  10 April  1967  during which  representatives of  the  Mines  Safety  and Health 
Commission's  Secretariat gave  a  statement  on  the  result of  its work.  The  Secretariat 
also  gave  its assistance during  the  trade  union  teach-ins held at Haltern on 30 June 
1967. 
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STATISTICS 
This section follows  the  same  pattern as  that of  the  Summary  Report  attach-
ed  to the Third Report  and that of  the  Fourth  Report. 
The  statistical tables of serious and  fatal accidents  in the  various  Com-
munity coalfields  in  1967 will be  found  in the Annex.  As  usual,  the  figures  are 
given  by  causes of accidents  for  the different coalfields and  countries,  and  for  the 
Community. 
Tables A  and  B,  below  show  the  figures  by  causes of accidents  in  Community 
countries  from  1958  to  1967.  Table  C  gives  the  same  data  for  the  period  from  1960 to 
1967  for  group accidents,  i.e.  those  involving more  than  five  serious or  fatal  casu-
alties.  Graphs  1-6,  following this section,  give  the  same  data  for all accidents, 
including  group  accidents,  thus bringing out  a  certain statistical trend or at least 
certain variations over  the  years.  It is recalled that  a  Working  Party on  Joint Sta-
tistics of Accidents  in Coalmines  is being set up  to  examine  how  far  these statistics 
are  comparable  and  what  can  be  done  to  improve  them  in this respect.  In addition,  in 
view of  the  comparative  shortness of  the  period covered,  it does  not  as  yet  seem  pos-
sible to establish  a  statistical trend  from  these tables.  This  being so,  the  remarks 
which  follow are offered with  certain reservations,  as  in the  two  previous Reports. 
Examination of  the  number  of fatalities below  ground  per million man-hours 
(Table Band Graph  l)  shows  that,  from  1966  to  1967,  the  fatality rate fell  by  14,7%. 
The  actual  number  of  fatalities fell  from  347  to  269,  i.e.  28%,  but  the  number  of 
man-hours  was  down  from  698m  to  587m,  i.e.  16%.  This  fatality rate is well  below  the 
level  for  1961-1966  mentioned  in the  Fourth  Report  and  seems  to be  following  the  same 
downward  trend as  was  noted  in the  Summary  Report.  It should be  observed that,  in 
1967,  no  fatalities were  reported as  a  result of  group accidents  (actually,  two  ac-
cidents occurred with  five  fatalities each),  whereas  in  1965  and  in  1966  the  figures 
were  41  and  21  fatalities respectively. 
As  for  previous years,  it can  be  seen that,  in  1967,  accidents  listed under 
causes  I  to V  (Table  A  and  Graph  l)  were  responsible  for  92%  of all fatalities,  viz. 
cause  I  (rockfalls),  42%;  causes  II  and  III  (haulage  and  transport  and  movement  of 
personnel),  37%;  causes  IV  and  V  (machinery,  tools and  falling objects),  13%. 
Examination of  the serious-injury rate per million man-hours  (Table  A  and 
Graph  2)  shows  that,  although it apparently fell  in  1965  and  1966  while  showing  no 
more  than  the single standard deviation  from  the  arithmetical mean,  it was  unchanged 
in  1966-1967.  As  in the  years  surveyed  by  the  previous  two  Reports,  the  same  five 
causes were  responsible  for  the  great bulk  (97.2%)  of  the  seriously  injured,  with 
the  incidence  about  equally divided  among  cause  I  (rockfalls),  30%,  causes  II  and 
III  (haulage  and  transport and  movement  of personnel),  33%,  and  causes  IV  and  V 
(machinery,  tools and  falling objects)  also  33%. 
As  Graph  4  shows,  rockfalls,  though still the  largest single factor,  showed 
a  decrease  of  3%  in  1967 as  compared with  7%  for  1965  and  1966  together;  this annual 
drop  of  about  3%  seems  to  be  a  regular  feature.  For  transport  (II  and  III)  the rate 
also went  down  by  2.2%  in 1967 as against 3.2% for  1965  and  1966,  while  that  for  the 
handling of  equipment  and  for  falling objects  (IV  and  V)  rose  6%,  thus  confirming the 
generally upward  trend in the  rate of  such  accidents,  noted  in the  previous  two  Re-
ports,  where  it was  observed that this  increase might  be  associated with  the  concen-
tration and mechanisation drive  which  has  been  a  feature  of  the  last decade. 
Lastly,  as  in the previous  two  Reports,  the  number  of fatalities and  serious 
injuries per  number  of  tons extracted will  be  found  in Table  D,  these  figures  being 
purely  for  guidance  as was  stated previously. 
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The  Recapitulatory Table  and  Tables  5  and  6  below  show  that  Community  pro-
duction fell  10%  and  the  number  of man-hours  by  16%,  while productivity went  up  by 
8%. 
The  fatality rate per million tons  extracted fell below  1.5  (in  1958 it 
exceeded 3),  and  the serious-injuries rate went  down  by  a  third in the  same  period, Germany 
(North  Rhine/Westphalia 
C  AU  S  E  and  Saar) 
(1958-1962) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1958 
1)  Falls of  ground  4.843  4-77!  4.886 4,797 4,682  5.911 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2,55(  2,56!  2.44  2.451  2,501  4,13! 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  2.497 2.463 2.34  2.512  2.60E  1.354 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports  0.76  0.914  0.921  0,867 1.046  2.8~ 
5)  Falling objects  2.53  2. 71!  2,  73  2.945 3.071  0.41 
6)  Explosives  O.OH  0,011  O.OH  0.009  0.00!  0.02 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0.011  0.016  - 0.002  0.123  -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - - - 0.011 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - 0.003  0.002  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  0.004  - - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.01(  0.014  0.012  0.014  0,006  0.011 
12)  Other  causes  0.487  0,522  0.457 0.503  0.488 0.26( 
TOTAL  13.721 14.007 13.819  14,109  14.539  4.924 
(1963-1967)  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1963 
1)  Falls of  ground  4.663  4.894 4.  732  4,721 4.524  4.432 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2.433 2.385 2.411  2:067 1.913  3.565 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  2.646 2.744  3.032  2,852 2.974  1.066 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  1.213  1,242  1,234  1,244 1.124  2.414 
5)  Falling objects  3.03!  3.242  3.344  3.272 3.642  0.547 
6)  Explosives  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.005 0.017  0.019 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0.01(  - 0.014  0.013  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - 0.005  - 0.003  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  0.004  - - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.012  0.009  0.002  0.010 0,006  0,009 
12)  Other  causes  0.473  0.47  7  0.354  0.414 0.396  0.198 
TOTAL  14.499 14-99  915.133  4.598  f-4. 599  i'2 ,25( 
A.  Comparative  Table of 
numbers  of persons  incapacitated by  underground accidents 
for  eight weeks  or  longer 
years  1958-67 
per  '000,000 man-hours 
France  Belgium 
(excl.  Provence) 
1959  1960  1961  1962  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1958  1959 
4.294 4.32  4.071  4.43!  5,02  4,66f  4.774 4,416 4.222  1-35f  1,37 
2.97!  2.7?1  2.77(  3,33  1,98(  1.69f  1,92(  2 .JOE  2 .19E  1,335  0,98 
0,99E  1.00!  1,062  1,13!  1,50:  1.11E  2,873  2.334  2.45!  0,66E  0,39 
2.085 2.381  2.09  2.46  0,914  1.022  1,621  2,523  2.991  1.16!  0,984 
0.371  0.35  0,30  0.44  l,  89(  2.18  1.893  2.292  2.073  1,16!  1,96 
0.007 0.03:  0.01!  - 0,043  0,051  0.031  0,01  0.051  0.16  -
- - - - 0,04  0.08!  - - 0.004  - -
- - - - 0,004  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - 0.01(  - - - - - - -
- O.OlE  O.OlS  0.01(  0.014  - 0.004  0,029 0.004  - -
0.255 0.26(  0.301  0,331  2.956  2,768  0,793  0,362  0.24C  0,334  0,591 
10.989  11.08! 10.63! 12.16  14.38( 13. 594 13.909 14.079 14.239 6,197 6,29! 
1964  1965  1966  1967  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1963  1964 
4.417 3.57  3,56!  3.85(  4.177  4,30E  3.941 3.927 3,634  0,366  0,893 
3.419 2.861  3.269 2.96<  2,364  2.27E  2.153  1.85!  1.918 1,465  1,78 
0.961  0.77  0,936 0.903  2,368 2,383  2.087 2.239  2.174  0,732  1.78 
2 .31(  2.121  2.146 2.26f  3.096  3.042  2.272  2.639 2.773  1.465 3,12 
0.397 0,292  0.349 0.45!  2o27!  2.074  1.839 1. 785  2.114 3.296  3.574 
0.018  - 0.013 0.056  0.009 0.013  0.037 0,01(  0.011  0,366  -
0.009 0.031  - - - - - 0.029  - - -
- - 0,013  - - - - - 0.005  - -
- 0.021  - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 0.01  - 0.005  - - -
- 0.01(  0.013  - 0.014  0,009  0.014  - 0.005  - -
0.268 0.33  3  0.362  0,278  0.354  0.22  0.174  0.20C  0.185  - -
ll.  799 10.02  10.669 10,771  4.66( 14.34  13,017  12.692 12,819  7.69C  1.16 
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
1960  1961  1962  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962 
1.80  - 0.792  1,326  1,464  1,30~  1,829 2,238 4,84€  4.49(  4,571  4.434  4.387 
1,20  0,676  1,847 1,511  1,562  1,89!  1,924  2 .59(  2,602  2,347 2,31  2.371  2.521 
1,00  1,578 1,056  0,324  0,386  0,18  0,514  0.58(  2,003  1,823  2  ,18~  2.185 2.282 
0,60:  0,902  1.584 0.617 0,402  0,78(  0,915  1.015 1.09!  1.064 1.26  1.423 1.  712 
1,80  2,029 2,375  0,401  0,515  0,492  0,819  0.642  1.962 2,161  2,10:  2.353  2.375 
- 0.225  - - - - - - 0.023  0,02(  0,01  0.012  0.018 
- - - - - - - - 0.011  0,030 0,01<  0,001  0,071 
- - - - - - - - 0.002  - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - 0.002  0.001  -
- - - - - - - - 0.002  - - - 0.001 
- - - - - - - 0,021  0.01(  0.008 0.01(  0.018 0,007 
0,60:  0.451  - 0.262  0,161  0.39C  0.21C  0.497  0.985  1,012  0,513  0,428  0.404 
7,03  5.861  7.654 4,441  4,490 5.051  6,212  7,583 13.551 12.954 12.986 13.227  13.781 
1965  1966  1967  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
5,57  6.360  5.58(  l,  742  2,017 1.923  1.68E 2.466  4.337 4.509 4.2H  4.186  4.06( 
- 0,707  0.79  1,826 1.952  2.80E  2.621 1.866  2 ,52(  2.346  2.416  2.173  2.037 
- 0,707  1. 59  0,630 0.472  0,774  0.605 0.766  2,261  2,326  2,364  2.320  2.354 
7,16  7,067  3,552 1,050 1,094 1,282 2.066 0.833  1.818 1.848 1.773  1.815  1.790 
0,791  - 6.37  0.630 0,923  0,862  0.958  0.866  2.406  2,442  2.415  2.362  2.638 
- - - - 0,021  - - - 0.01<  0.011  0.013  0.007  0,019 
- - - - - - - - 0.006  0.001  0,011  0,016  -
- - - - - - - - - - 0.002  0.001  a.  <XXI 
- - - - - - - - - - 0,002  - -
- - - - - - - - 0.002  0.003  - 0,001  -
- - - - 0,021  - - - 0,012  0.008 0.006  0,007  0.005 
1,59  3.360 3.189 0,147  0,129  0.088  0,353 0.700  0.39(  0,364  0.28  9  0.354  0.337 
15,12  18,201 jJJ..OB!  6.025 6,629  7.73  8.291 7,497  13.781 13,861  3 .SOE 13.242 13.246 
-Germany 
C  A U S  E 
(North Rhine/westphalia 
and  Saar) 
(1958-1962) 
1958  1959  1960  1:961  1962  1958 
1)  Falls of  ground  0.268 0.290  0.263  0.216  0.280 0.223 
2)  Haulage  and transport  0.179  0.169  0.182  0.196  0.149  0,101 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0.094  0,097  0,07C  0,086  0,059  0,011 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
0.010 0.027  0.012  0,027 0,037  0.005  and  supports 
5)  Falling objects  0,065 0,041  0.039  0.065 0,094  0,016 
6)  Explosives  0,009 0.003  0.003  - 0.004  0,011 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
0.011  0.012  coal dust  - - 0.66C  -
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp 
0.005  0.003  0.002  0.004  0.002  0.016  suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground combustion  and fires  - 0.003  - 0.002  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - 0.003  0.002  - - 0,011 
11)  E1ectrici  ty  0.022  0.008  0,002  0,005 0,010 0,021 
12)  Other  causes  0.025  0,025  0.036  0.049  0.049 0.005 
TOTAL  0.687  0.680  0,611  0.651  1.344 0,42( 
(1963-1967)  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1963 
1)  Falls of  ground  0.260 0.200  0.184  0.197 0.206  0,264 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0.178 0.200  0.191  0,175 0.150 0.245 
3)  Movement  of personnel  0.089  0.071  0,07(  0,094 0.076  0.057 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and supports  0.019  0,028  0.02~  0,03(  0.020  -
5)  Falling objects  0,072  0.054  0,051  0,048 0.063  0,019 
6)  Explosives  - 0.002  - - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,002  0,002  0.019  0,056  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - 0,002  0,002 0.007  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 0.006  0.009  0,005  - - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  0.004  - - - - 0,019 
11)  Eiectrici  ty  0,002  0.004  0.005  - 0.003  0.009 
12)  Other  causes  0,025 0,017  0.023  0,027 0.017  0,028 
TOTAL  0,657  0,587  0,582  0,629 0.542  0,641 
Belgium 
1959  1960 
0.213  0.299 
0.124  0.157 
0.02  0.008 








.  0.008 
0.413  0.536 
1964  1965 
0.222  0,239 
0,166  0,166 
0.021  0.011 







0.005  o.ou 
0.005  -
0.471  0.542 
accidents resulting in  death within eight weeks 
years  1958-67 
per  '(X)(), 000 man-hours 
France 
(excl.  Provence) 
1961  1962  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  19;8 
0,266  0.246  0.235  0.192  0,186  0,219  0.167 0.167 
0.168 0.142  0.115  0,08~  0.082  0,122  0,077  . 
0.035  0.010 0,007  0,018  0,027 0.008 0.043  . 
0.027  0,047  0,018 0,04(  0,016  0.008 0.030  -
- 0.010 0.025  0.007 0.004  0.017 0.030  . 
- - - 0,026  - - - 0,501 
- - 0,115 0,121  - - 0.004  -
- 0,047 0.043  0.026  0,019  0,004  - 0.167 
- - - - - - - . 
0.044  0.047  - - - 0.004  - -
- - - 0.011  0,012  - 0,009  -
0.009 0.019 0.036  0,029 0.008  - 0.009  . 
0.549  0,568 0.594  0.555 0.354  0.382  0.369  0.835 
1966  1967  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1963 
0.324 0.264  0.120 0,127 0,164  0,214  0.159  0.366 
0.187 0.180 0.121  0.141  0,052  0.126  0.088  -
0.025  - 0,009 0.009 0,042  0,024  0.016  -
0,025 0.028 0.009  0.036 0,009  0.015  0.016  -
- - o.oo9 o.ou  0,019 0.015  0.011  -
- - 0.005 0,005  0,009  0.005  0.005  -
- - - - 0,155  - - -
0,013  - 0,019 o.oos  - 0.005 0.027  -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - 0,005  - 0.005  -
- 0.014  0,024  - - 0.010  - -
0.013  0.042  0.014  0.014  - 0,005  0.005  -
•.. 
O.bP7  0,528 0.330  0.359 
I 
0,455  0.419  0.332  0.366 
~ 
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
1959  1960  1961  1962  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962 
- 0.201  0.225  - 0.262  0.064  0,034  0.114  0,06  0.253  0.242  0.235  0,217  0,234 
0.197  - - - 0.07  0,14f  0.067 0.095  0.06~  0,147  0.141  0,146  0,168 0,124 
- - - - - - - - - 0.057  0.063  0.047  0,056  0.045 
- - - - 0.015  0,016  - - 0,04  0.011  0,028  0.012  0,021  0,037 
0.197  - - - - 0,016  - - - 0.045  0.027  0.024  0.041  0,062 
- - - - - - - - - 0,009  O,OlC  0.002  - 0.002 
- - - - - - - - - 0.032  0.036  0,002  - 0,375 
- - - - - - - - - 0.016  O,OlC  0,006  0,003  0.007 
- - - - - - - - - - 0.003  - 0,001  -
- - - - - - - - - 0.002  0.002  o.oo1  0,006  0,005 
- - - - - - - 0,019  - 0.016  0,007  0.007  0,004  0,008 
- - - - - - 0,017  - - 0.023  0.021  0.024  0,029  0.032 
0.394  0.201  0,225  - 0.35f  0,241  0,119  0,229  0,16E  0.610 0,59C  o~~.so7  0,546  0,932 
1964  1965  1966  1967  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
- - - - 0.084  0.043  0,044  0.050 0.1()(  0.217  0,175  0,177  0.208  0.192 
- - - ~.797  0.101  0.172  0,177 0,126  - 0,167  0,17~ 0,149  0,.160  0.128 
- - - - - - - - - 0,060 0,045  0,051 0.060 0.044 
- - - lo· 797  - - 0.022  - 0,06  0,013  0,03(  0.024  0.023  0.024 
- - - - - 0,04:  - - - 0.046  0,031  0.037 0.030 0.036 
- - - - - - - - - 0,001  0.002  0,002  0,001  0.002 
- - - - - - - - - 0,001  0,001  0,053  0,030  -
- - - - - - - - - 0,005  0,002  0,006  0,004  0.012 
- - - - - - - - - 0,003  0,005  o.oo5  0  -
- - - - - - - - - 0,005  - 0.001  0  0.002 
- - - - - - - - - 0,008 0,003  0,004  0.003  0.004 
- - - - - - - - - 0.021  0.014 0.013  0,017  0.015 
- - - .594  0,189  0,25  0,243  0,176  0,16  0,547  0,492  0,522  0.536  0.457 C  A  U  S  E 
0960-1963) 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3) Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust 
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp, 
su.ffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
ll)  Electricity 
12)  Other  causes 
TCYrAL 
(1964-1967) 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  Or 
coal  dust 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
10)  Inrushes  of  water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other  causes 
TOTAL 
Germany 
N.  Rhine/Westph.+  Saar 
1960  11961  1962  1963 
212110  6 
3162~ 
212110  4163~ 
1964  1965 I 1966  1967 
2  15114·-
- '- ·114181215121 
21  5114  4181215121 
c.  Comparative  Table  of  underground  group  accidents  (see  (c)  below) 
years  1960-67 
Belgium 
1960 I 1961  1962  I 1963 
216 
11216 
1964 I  1965  1966  I 1967 
France 
(excl.  Provence) 
1960  I  1961  1962 I 1963 
7  6 
7  6 
1964  1965  1966 I  1967 
h  1 "  '  ·' 
21  -1331116 
21- 133  6 
Italy 
1960  I  1961 I  1962 
1964  1965 I  1966 
(a)  Casualties  were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least  eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five casualties of  type  (a). 
(N)  Number  of  group  accidents, 
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D,  RECAPITULATION:  COMMUNITY  OVERALL 
Serious  Serious  Serious 
Extrac- Under- injuries  Fatal- Fatal- injuries  In m,  injuries 
Year 
tion  ground  Fatal- (disable- ities per  ities in  in m. 
(m.  o.m.s,  man- ities  per  m.  m. 
hours  ment  for  m,  tons  man- man-
tons)  (kg.)  tons  hours  8  weeks  ( 1)  (l)  hours 
or over) 
1958  252.278  1,634  1,260  770  17,074  3,052  67.68  0.610  13,551 
1959  240.602  1,788  1,122  622  14.539  2.585  60.43  0,590  12.950 
1960  239.967  1,958  1,037  526  13.459  2.192  56.09  0.507  12.986 
1961  235.848  2,100  962  527  12.720  2.235  53.93  0.548  13,227 
1962  233.233  2,229  901  840  (2)  12.418  3.602  (2)  53.24  0.932  (2)  13.781 
541  (3)  2.320  (3)  0.600  (3) 
--f-· 
1963  229.769  2,331  849  465  11.686  2.024  50.86  0.547  13.761 
1964  235.007  2,395  841  411  11.726  1.749  49.89  0.493  13.860 
------------ ------- -------·--··--·-1---·-···----- -·---------· 
1965  224.249  2,461  784  410  10.595  1.828  47.25  0.522  13,506 
------ --------·  -----·---- --------·-----
1966  210. 189  2,611  698  374  9.247  1.779  43.99  0.536  13.242 
--r----·-- ------
1967  189.484  2,824  587  269  7.781  1.420  41.06  0.457  13.246 
··-------1-------·-1---·-·--·--·-·--- -----·-····----·--· f-------·--- -----
1968 
( 1)  Incl.  net extraction,  slurry and  dust, 
(2)  Incl.  Luisenthal explosion. 
(3)  Excl.  Luisenthal explosion. GRAPHS 
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to Roman figures In Graphs 
Falls of ground 
II  Haulage and transport 
Ill  Movement of personnel 
IV  Machinery, handling of tools and supports 
V  Falling objects 
VI  Explosives 
VII  Explosions of firedafTip or coal dust 
VIII  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, suffocation by natural gases 
IX  Fires and underground combustion 
X  Inrushes of water 
XI  Electricity 
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6 SECTION  III 
DEVELOPMENTS  IN  CONNECTION  WITH  MINE  SAFETY 
The  introduction of  new  safety regulations and  the  implementation of  the 
Mines  Safety and Health Commission's  Recommendations  on  1  January  1966,  were  dealt 
with  in detail  in the Third Report  and  in Comments  in the accompanying  Summary  Re-
port,  The  Fourth  Report  only mentioned  the  regulations that  came  into  force  in 1966. 
The  present report will only discuss  the  manner  in which  the  Mines  Safety 
and Health Commission's  Recommendations  and directives were  applied.  Annex  II  gives 
detailed account  of  the replies received, together with  the position as at  1  January 
1966  and  1  January  1968. 
By  and  large,  the  202  recommendations  and  directives on  technical matters 
were  well  observed.  They  were  covered by  safety regulations,  and  where  these  did  not 
exist,  they were  applied  in practice, 
The  reasons  why  certain proposals are  not  applied  in  some  countries are 
shown at the  foot  of  the  page;  in most  cases it is due  to  local conditions. 
In 61  cases,  the proposals were  applied to better effect  in  1966-1968, 
145  proposals were  made  on  the subject of  human  factors,  80  of which  were 
approved  by  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  in  1966  and  are  therefore  included 
in the  questionnaire  for  the  first  time,  It should be  added  that  these  new  proposals 
were  also  adequately observed,  like the  previous  65;  among  the  latter the situation 
improved  in 43  cases, 
The  situation can  be better judged when  it is pointed out  that the  Mines 
Safety and Health  Commission's  proposals,  which  that  Commission  described as  "recom-
mendations"  and  "directives" are without  the  legal  force  conferred on  these  terms 
by  the Paris and  Rome  Treaties,  It should also be  noted that these  proposals  are  far 
from  being equal  in  importance,  some  only being quoted as  an  aide-memoire  and  not 
calling for  a  reply.  It can  therefore  be  said that  the  Governments  have  substantially 
observed the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission's  proposals. 
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